Talk:Empirical validation
one of you Popper guys needs to take a look at this. If you're a particle physicist, so much the better...
This either isn't true or badly misleading
- Two important precepts of empirical validations under the current particle physics foundation ontology and associated paradigm are that an experiment must produce the same results for three different sets of researchers with three different experimental apparatus, and that predictions asserted must pass the test of falsifiability, i.e. they are conceivably disprovable by some such reasonable method. A "fact", in science, must be so conceivably disprovable - facts are grounded in the scientific method and trust in the scientific process involving many scientists. The definition of what constitute facts and method is a major study in philosophy of science. Critics of particle physics research note that the limited number of apparatus, tight schedules, and moral hazards of the funding process, actually argue against the validity of some of the science.
1) This has nothing to do specifically with particle physics at all or with particle physics foundation ontology as I understand the term. 2) There isn't any fixed criteria for beliving a result. The more people get the same result, the more people tend to believe that no one made a mistake
Cognitive science doesn't particular investigate these concerns. Also the philosophy of mathematics deals with wildly different issues than philosophy of science
- These are concerns investigated in cognitive science in particular, and increasingly in philosophy of mathematics.
Number itself may require some empirical validation, as Eugene Wigner suggested in 1960, and as Erdös numbers seem to provide.
This needs to be rewritten. An unattributed statement that something "may" happen in the future doesn't belong in wikipedia. Since it also *may not* happen. If someone believes that this is likely to happen then there should be a statement that says that "so and so believes that it is likely in the future that ..... "
- The philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, and the current foundation ontology, i.e. the particle physics foundation ontology, may well collide in the near future and be forced to make assumptions indistinguishable from each other. Some, e.g. George Lakoff and Pope John Paul II, assert that they already have, and suggest respectively a cognitive science of mathematics and a new respect for faith in reason.
The "may" problem again. This sentence has no content. I can say just as easily the empirical validation may have no limits, and we humans may not need to live with that fact.
- Empirical validation itself may have limits, and we humans as a species may simply have to live with that.
If someone out believes this then it needs to be attributed.
This is false
- however, for certain infeasible or unethical or more secret experiments it may be curtailed in favor of some other reasonable method.
If an experiment can't be done, then it can't be done and you can't draw conclusions from a non-existent experiment.
This is also false. This isn't what Kuhn meant at all by a paradigm shift.
- Different notions of empirical validation, in particular shifts in both the epistemology assumed in the scientific process and the foundation ontology against which empirical results are assessed for consistency, have often tended to force what Thomas Samuel Kuhn called "paradigm shifts".
Come to think of it. This is also false