Military Professional Resources Inc.

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L-3 MPRI was a global provider of private military contractor services with customers that included the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, law enforcement agencies, foreign governments, government agencies, and commercial businesses.

L-3 MPRI was based in Alexandria, Virginia. L-3 MPRI's President was retired US Army General Bantz J. Craddock.[1] The CEO was Carl E. Vuono.

History[edit]

L-3 MPRI, now known as Engility Corporation, was incorporated in 1987 by eight former senior military leaders, including Carl E. Vuono, a former Army Chief of Staff, who joined the company in 1993. General William F. Kernan of the U.S. Army also joined the firm after his military service.

In June 2000, L-3 MPRI became a division of L-3 Communications Corporation, which specializes in various areas, including Command, Control, and Communications; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C3ISR); government services; training and simulation; aircraft modernization and maintenance; and electronic systems. L-3 is also a major provider of homeland defense products and services.

As part of a spin-off, L-3 MPRI became part of the newly independent company, ENGILITY Corporation.

Training[edit]

MPRI began by almost exclusively employing retired U.S. military personnel.

It used retired military personnel and current U.S. National Guard or reservists to run Reserve Officer Training Corps programs at more than 200 universities. Other employees have worked in U.S. Army recruitment centers and trained U.S. soldiers. With offices in other countries, employees also have trained foreign armies at ranges in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Kuwait, and South Africa. MPRI offered a range of services to its clients, drawing on expertise from various fields such as the military, law enforcement, analysis, disaster management, diplomacy, and the private sector.

In 1995, before Operation Storm, according to some sources, MPRI provided training and preparation to the Croatian Army prior to its offensive to retake the Krajina region. In April 1995, training for the Democracy Transition Assistance Program (DTAP) began at the "Petar Zrinski" military school in Zagreb.[2] Deborah Avant discusses the controversy in her book The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security.[3] MPRI provided (along with a French Foreign Legion organized training camp in Šepurine near Zadar) mainly training for commissioned officers, but a 1999 study published in the journal of the U.S. Army War College concluded that the company had no significant intelligence activities or professional influence on senior Croatian military strategy and tactics.[4] The U.S. government approved MPRI's engagement.[5]

Local forces in Croatia were referred to MPRI by the United States Department of Defense and used their training. 120 African leaders and more than 5,500 African troops have been trained on security issues by MPRI.[6]

MPRI started training the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for $140 million after 1995, when the Dayton Accords were established.[7] On the back of its success in Croatia, MPRI won the approximately $50 million ‘Train and Equip’ contract for the Bosnian Federation army, which ran from July 1996.[8] The training contract was accompanied by an approximately $100 million arms transfer program. The contract began with restructuring the Ministry of Defense and claimed to create a combined logistics system between the initial separate Muslim and Croat armies. While the contractors claimed they had combined the logistics system, assessments made in the 2000s disagreed: ‘the force integration of the Federation army has been superficial and limited to some cooperation at the HQ level.’ The contract also included the development of training policy, assistance with unit training, and the establishment of a central combat training center, including a school at Hadzici and a field combat simulation center at Livno. While the facilities may have been constructed, whether the training and logistics system changes lasted is uncertain, given Maxwell’s assessment.[9]

MPRI-trained security forces were used to defeat an attack on the presidential palace of Equatorial Guinea's long-serving dictator Teodoro Obiang Nguema.[10]

Defense contracts[edit]

In the early 1990s, MPRI signed a 5-year contract with the U.S. State Department involving the shipment of donated medical supplies and food to former Soviet states.

In 1998, the government of Equatorial Guinea asked MPRI to evaluate its defense systems, particularly its need for a coast guard to protect its oil reserves. To be eligible for the job, MPRI needed a license from the U.S. State Department. The Clinton administration rejected the request, citing the West African nation's human rights record. In 2000, after lobbying by MPRI, the State Department issued the license. MPRI did not reveal the terms of its contract with Equatorial Guinea.[11]

In 1999, MPRI signed an 18-month, $4.3 million contract to work with the military in Colombia on the drug war. The contract expired in March 2001 and was not renewed, allegedly because the Colombian Defense Ministry and its officers were upset by recommendations such as "Hit the enemy with a closed fist; do not poke at him with the fingers of an open hand." (Note: This is a maxim of World War II German General Heinz Guderian.) [12]

According to a United States Department of Defense census, MPRI has at least 500 employees working in Iraq on 12 different contracts, including mentoring civilian workers at the Ministry of Defense.[13]

MPRI, under a US Department of Defense contract, conducted training and advisory services for the Afghan National Army (ANA). Also supported in various areas are logistical and advisory services in regional areas of Afghanistan.

MPRI is a contractor for the US State Department's Bureau of African Affairs and provides training in African countries, including Uganda, with an emphasis on pre-deployment training of UPDF en route to support African Union initiatives in Somalia.

Lawsuit[edit]

A group of Serbs who lived in Krajina until Operation Storm sued MPRI for their alleged participation in military activities, including militarily equipping the Croatian Armed Forces, training Croatian officers, and developing a plan for Operation Storm. The claim was presented to the Federal Court in Chicago, and the plaintiffs were asking for $10.4 billion in compensation.[14][15]

On September 26, 2014, the lawsuit was rejected by Judge John Lee because the war in former Yugoslavia is not under the jurisdiction of this court.[16]

References[edit]

  1. ^ "MPRI". Archived from the original on 2013-05-17. Retrieved 2010-07-07.
  2. ^ Singer, P.W. (2003-06-01). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell University Press. pp. 119–125. ISBN 9780801441141.
  3. ^ Avant, 2005, p.103, citing stories in the London Sunday Telegraph, US News and World Report, and Economist, 1995.
  4. ^ Adams, Thomas K. (Summer 1999). "The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict". Parameters. United States Army War College: 103–16. Archived from the original on 2001-03-10. |
  5. ^ Smith, Eugene B. (Winter 2002). "The new condottieri and US policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its implications". Parameters. United States Army War College: 5–6. Retrieved 13 April 2008.
  6. ^ Wayne, Leslie (2002-10-13). "America's For-Profit Secret Army". The New York Times. Retrieved 2007-11-05.
  7. ^ How 'Operation Storm' Destabilized the Balkans, Written by JUGOISTOK Belgrade, Serbia
  8. ^ Singer, 2003, 128-129
  9. ^ Rohan Maxwell, 'Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.1,' paper given at the 'New Armies from Old' Conference, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2010
  10. ^ More of the World's Worst Dictators. Number 14. Parade.
  11. ^ Yeoman, Barry (2003-06-01). "Soldiers of Good Fortune". Mother Jones. Retrieved 2007-05-08.
  12. ^ "Colombia: Outsourcing War". The Center for Public Integrity. Archived from the original on 2007-06-05. Retrieved 2007-11-05.
  13. ^ Merle, Renae (December 5, 2006). "Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq". The Washington Post. Retrieved May 12, 2010.
  14. ^ RTS: Срби из Чикага туже америчку фирму због "Олује"
  15. ^ RTS: "Олуја" пред америчким судом
  16. ^ "'MI NISMO ZA TO NADLEŽNI' Sud u Chicagu odbacio tužbu Srba zbog vojne akcije Oluja - Jutarnji.hr". www.jutarnji.hr. Archived from the original on 2014-09-27.

Further reading[edit]

  • Deborah Avant, 'The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatising Security,' Cambridge University Press, 2005
  • Fred Tanner, Security Sector Reform: Lessons from Bosnia and Hercegovina, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, paper prepared for DCAF-IISS Workshop on Security Sector Reform, 23–24 April 2001

External links[edit]

http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2004/04/15/warriors/index.html

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