Talk:Battle of Khe Sanh

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Former featured article candidateBattle of Khe Sanh is a former featured article candidate. Please view the links under Article milestones below to see why the nomination failed. For older candidates, please check the archive.
On this day... Article milestones
DateProcessResult
November 28, 2006WikiProject A-class reviewNot approved
December 13, 2006WikiProject A-class reviewNot approved
March 22, 2007WikiProject A-class reviewApproved
July 24, 2007Featured article candidateNot promoted
November 22, 2017WikiProject A-class reviewKept
On this day... Facts from this article were featured on Wikipedia's Main Page in the "On this day..." column on January 21, 2007, January 21, 2008, January 21, 2009, January 21, 2010, January 21, 2012, January 21, 2014, and January 21, 2018.
Current status: Former featured article candidate

Tactical victory for allies?[edit]

The battle was a defeat for the U.S. Under concerted pressure and bombardment the U.S. forces and their allies were driven into and confined to the base area of Khe Sanh. The PAVN controlled the entire western third of Quang Tri provence with American forces holding the base trapped, vulnerable, and difficult to resupply. Westmoreland's removal and replacement as commander of U.S. forces in Viet Nam signalled the end of the battle and defeat, as his replacement abandoned Khe Sanh and pulled back to the mountians at the edge of the coastal lowlands. Subsequent attmepts to push inland toward Khe Sanh were checked at Fire Bases Henderson and Holcomb. The brief reoccupation of Khe Sanh in Lom Son 719 was an unmittigated disaster for the U.S. forces, leaving the entire western portion of Quang Tri provence firmly in PAVN hands and set the stage for the Easter Offensive of 1972 which resulted in the loss of the defensive line along the DMZ. Having complete air superiority allowed the U.S. to halt PAVN advances with carpet bombing and intense tactical air strikes giving the illusion of tactical victory. Continued pressure by the PAVN against U.S. ground forces, however, led to a U.S. casualty rate that was unacceptable to the American public. We could hold Khe Sanh, but at what cost? Not one we were willing to continue to pay with no end in sight. Thus, despite the huge advantage of complete air superiority by the U.S., North Viet Nam could turn most so-called tactical victories for the U.S. into strategic defeats in the end. They hoped and guessed correctly that they could outlast us in battle, as the price they were willing to pay and the sacrefices they would make were far greater for far longer. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Tonygumbrell (talkcontribs) 23:54, 21 January 2010 (UTC)[reply]

One battle, not the whole war please. The North Vietnamese abandoned the battlefield, granted, not much by Vietnam standards, but abandon it they did. The base did not fall and the casualties inflicted upon PAVN formations were horrendus by comparison. Tactical victory but strategic defeat, you better believe it.RM Gillespie (talk) 15:46, 21 December 2010 (UTC)[reply]
It seems this issue has arisen once again—whether one side achieved enough of its goals over the other side so it could rightly be said it had achieved a victory.

People have argued a number of factors to evaluate victory:

  • Eventual U.S. withdrawal. Using this logic, the Allies lost WWII because they eventually withdrew from Germany; it makes no sense to me. In addition, as RM_Gillespie argues above, the article covers this one battle not the entire war.
  • The casualty or kill ratio was not high enough in favor of the U.S. and South Vietnam. Obviously this makes no sense; battles have been won by the side with higher losses (e.g., Iwo Jima).
  • Neither side can be proclaimed victor because both sides claim victory. This also makes no sense; losing leaders sometimes claim victory (e.g., Saddam Hussein, 1991).
  • In a siege battle, evaluating whether the attacker achieved his objectives. This is the only criterion that makes sense IMHO.

Using this fourth criterion, in my opinion the most sound argument is that the NVA instigated the battle, their primary objective was to take the base and kill or capture its occupants ala Dien Bien Phu (publicly stated by North Vietnamese I believe, and evidenced by the fact the NVA endured huge losses to come very near to the base), and they eventually withdrew and ended the siege failing to achieve their objective.

I am open to discussions and would love to hear any rational arguments as to how the battle's result could be no more definitive than "Both sides claimed victory" which strikes me as disingenuous and weasel wording at best. I am reverting my previous edit and will be happy to take it down if someone can make a rational argument why this reasoning is faulty. By the way, the claimed citation to a publication by Peter Brush is a dead link and I could not find it after a quick search on the web. IMHO a citation to an author claiming one side achieved a victory or not is not very relevant in this case as there is no problem finding biased authors especially ones biased against the U.S.' involvement in Vietnam. However I will add one since *Treker requested it. —MBbjv (talk) 10:06, 4 September 2016 (UTC)[reply]

As to your first argument, it would fit better if the Allies had left Germany in the face of German troops at war with them occupying the ground immediatly after they left.

The other problem i have with your argument is that you assume vietnamese intentions and base victory/defeat on that; obviously a force can win a strategic victory even if they do not achieve their intended objective but instead another that supersedes it or another after changing strategic considerations made the first obsolete, etc. I would argue by observing what happened and how the different sides profited. In the end the Vietnamese were left in possession of the site, free to bring supplies through the surrounding valleys (the base had been part of a programm to cut off supply via the Ho Chi Minh path by a series of heavily fortified bases), free to operate in the surrounding country site (the CIDG programm also ended with the evacuation as far as i can tell), etc. As far as i can score it would make it a tactical USA/AVRN victory (casualties inflicted, objective held, no second Bien Dien Phu), an operational draw leaning towards the North Vietnamese (they ended up in command of the site and the province, took pressure of their supply routes while expnading significant assets), but a clear cut North Vietnamese strategic victory (no more American troops in Khe Sahn). In my opinion this is a classic example of a excellent strategic consideration, since the North Vietnamese established circumstances where they were highly likely to benefit no matter how things turned out: If they stormed Khe Sanh outright this repeat of Bien Dien Phu would most likely break American morale, if they could not, they would still bind significant forces (and attention) as well as support assets (the airpower used to ensure resupply alone and therefore not available elsewhere was probably enough to make it worthwhile) and thereby facilitate operations else. In other words: They fought a battle that would profit them on way or the other. The Americans did not. Either Khe Sahn was obsolete, in which case it should have been evacuated even before the siege started or it was worthwhile to have in which case it should not have been abandoned after the battle had been 'won'. The attritional concept espoused by top brass at the time and some times still today was obsolete by 1918, let alone 1968.212.100.51.120 (talk) 00:26, 23 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]

While the US abandoned the base at Khe Sanh, they did not just surrender control of the Khe Sanh plateau or western Quang Tri Province as they maintained mobile operations there (Operation Scotland II and others) until the drawdown of US forces. US forces had no difficulty in reoccupying Khe Sanh in February 1971 to support Operation Lam Son 719, however they soon encountered the same difficulties they had in 1968 - a large fixed base vulnerable to well concealed long-range PAVN artillery fire and sapper attacks. The Marines and later MACV-SOG occupied Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971.Mztourist (talk) 03:16, 23 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]

This again goes to the heart of the problem of US strategy in Vietnam. This was a guerilla war with parallel state structures being established by the enemy. Airmobile operations or even mobile operations can under such circumstances not maintain control over a territory. The troops roll in during the day and everybody who cooperates with them gets the axe at night when they are back at base. In the same vein it is no surprise that the US was able to reoccupy the base. That was never in question. To reoccupy you can use that foremost characteristic of American military though which is indiscriminate firepower. But they lost the ability to exercise control over the province or the population. Tactical superiority of the American forces in Vietnam was never in question as far as firepower and standup fights were concerned, but strategically they failed to secure the center of gravity (the population) and instead alienated them by what today is known as 'colleteral damage'. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 5.10.44.116 (talk) 17:26, 23 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]

As 212.100.51.120 correctly pointed out above, whatever happened the North Vietnamese would claim victory. Some writers regard the fact that the US abandoned the base and the PAVN "captured" it on 9 July 1968 as evidence that the PAVN won the battle, but as this was not a conventional war holding territory wasn't conclusive. The problem for the Americans in Quang Tri Province was that they had to try to keep the PAVN out of artillery and rocket range of the population centres where they were conducting pacification, which meant engaging the PAVN in the remote and sparsely populated areas along the DMZ. Couple this with Westmoreland's big unit attrition strategy and the need for large bases to support such operations and that led to Khe Sanh. The Marines wanted to conduct small unit operations and pacification, Westmoreland wanted them to seek out and fight the PAVN. Mztourist (talk) 03:23, 24 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Re: "Using this logic, the Allies lost WWII because they eventually withdrew from Germany;" I call your attention to the fact that the allies won World War II, and, get this, the U.S. lost the Vietnam War, and the lost battle of Khe Sanh during the war was a harbinger of further woes in Northern I Corps and moreover a significant defeat that marked a turning point in the war. The Commander-in-Chief after a disastrous meeting of his war cabinet (top and closest war advisors), announced he would not seek nor accept his party's renomination for President. Shortly thereafter he announced a troop level freeze and a bombing halt, presumably to pave the way for his successor to get us out. Nixon on taking office in Jan '69 announced no major changes at first, but under increasing pressure called for the Vietnamization of the war and sought 'peace' talks with North Vietnam. Fierce fighting continued sporadically but the war was a foregone conclusion the U.S. had had enough as more and more sickening, bad news from Vietnam bombarded the American public. The war was a lame duck war from the time of Johnson announcement that he was 'jumping ship'. Nixon tried to wind down the war slowly until peace agreement could be reached. The 'peace' agreement got the bulk of our forces out and the POWs returned. As soon as North Vietnam could build up its strength it rapidly overran the South, after Nixon had left office in disgrace, and Ford was President. 75.172.127.176 (talk) 02:29, 28 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
You make it sound like that is cheating ot something. That is actually genius and the very essence of strategy: Get, if you can, the other side in a double bind.

Either the Americans commit ever more ressource to a garrison that has already been cut off by land and basically feed men and machines and materiel in an attrition scenario with an enemy who regards an exchange rate of 1:10 as acceptable (and achieved much better) and can force the Americans to expand extraordinary levels of supply alone for the resupply runs, that is only keeping their troops alive inflicts a considerably heightened cost in supplies (Petroluem, Oil, lubricants, spare parts, ammunition for the combat aircrafts, etc.) and more attrition (a helicopter or aircraft only has so many hours until it breaks down) or evacuate the basis, weakening both the CIDG programm and the possibilities of intercepting supply through the DMZ as well giving the Vietcong/North Vietnamese breathing space and control over the local population. It is the ideal battle: How ever it turns out the North Vietnamese will get something for their commitment. 94.229.145.154 (talk) 15:51, 25 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]

I'm not making any judgment at all and said that as 212.100.51.120 correctly pointed out above, whatever happened at Khe Sanh the North Vietnamese would claim victory. They did this in every battle, even ones they just invented... Mztourist (talk) 18:46, 25 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Actually that is not what i said in that post. What i said was that however it would turn out the North Vietnamese WOULD HAVE WON SOMETHING. Either they would straight up take Khe Sahn, in which case the advantages would be obvious. Or they would be able to create a situation where their opponent could not withdraw without losing face and would be forced to feed evermore supplies into the battle which won him nothing while it was conducted, would only keep the status quo if won and where in defeat only the ever ephemeral 'body count' figures could be cited as victory. The North Vietnamese won something at Khe Sahn and would have no matter what happened independently of any propaganda annoucenments. The US however won nothing but dead enemies and even there it is doubtful whether the comparativly light North Vietnamese casualties were worth what had to be done in menhours, supplies, oil and flight hours to inflict them.77.75.203.108 (talk) 00:10, 29 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]
As user:Mztourist doesn't make any further argument, I think this discussion already has a result. Furthermore, unless he could give any RS which proves that the North Vietnam did confess that it lost the battle, or any RS that discredits the two sources I tagged in the article[1][2], it would be best appropriate to claim this battle as indecisive. Dino nam (talk) 02:57, 31 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Dino nam you can't just claim that because I haven't immediately responded to you that therefore I concede to your position and you can go and make a substantial change to the Infobox. The Infobox presents a nuanced view of all aspects of the outcome of the battle which has been developed by many users over time. The page also contains an entire section on the riddle of Khe Sanh presenting different views of what the North Vietnamese were actually trying to acheive there and the wider strategic impact of the battle. The fact is that from a conventional war viewpoint the US were in no way defeated at Khe Sanh and left the battlefield on their own terms, they continued to conduct mobile operations in the area for the next 3 years, occuppied Hill 950 and reoccuppied the base unopposed in February 1971. Mztourist (talk) 04:26, 31 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]
  • By your failure to discuss with the others on the talk page, you have violated the WP:COMMUNICATE regulation, which might lead to question of whether you have good faith while making such reverts.
  • The section about the riddle of Khe Sanh even further proves that the battle result can hardly be considered an Allied victory. How can you know the other side has been defeated when you haven't even know their purposes during the campaign?
  • "The fact is that from a conventional war viewpoint the US were in no way defeated at Khe Sanh..." → Provide RS to support what you say please. And also, don't try to defy me, but those RS that I've cited. Dino nam (talk) 08:53, 31 October 2016 (UTC)[reply]
There has been no failure to communicate by me, but you seem to believe that I am obliged to respond to you immediately which is not the case. As has been discussed above, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong would always claim victory no matter what occurred and would change their explanation of their strategy to suit the outcome. "Don't try to defy me" is a laughable comment and I do not intend to engage with you further pending the outcome of the Edit Warring complaint I have made. Mztourist (talk) 03:30, 1 November 2016 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes, of course, you aren't obliged to respond to me immediately. You're obliged to "start a discussion on the talk page if you want to restore your change, following our Bold, Revert, Discuss (BRD) cycle." (WP:COMMUNICATE).
  • You know why I have to say "don't defy me"? Because you're keep making chunks of OR like you're talking on the streets instead of on the talk page of WP. Again, provide RS to defy the RS someone has provided you next time, please. Good luck with your complaint. Dino nam (talk) 02:17, 2 November 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Dino nam there was consensus on the outcome of the battle which User: 14.177.199.124 and you decided to change. You made the change without discussing it here first and ignoring the consensus and so I was perfectly justified in reverting it based on that consensus. Its hilarious how you pick and choose policies to try to justify your position while completely ignoring consensus. I have only stopped reverting your change to avoid Edit-warring and will await the outcome of my Edit-warring and SPI complaints against you.Mztourist (talk) 03:18, 2 November 2016 (UTC)[reply]
You have a very good sense of humor when you cite an IP that doesn't even appear on this talk page and call it "consensus". The only thing I can see is that IP 77.75.203.108 has had the same opinion as I've had, so I don't need to say anything else. You had a different opinion, made a totally different editing but didn't say a word for 2 days on the talk page about what you had edited, and that's not my responsibility. Dino nam (talk) 04:46, 2 November 2016 (UTC)[reply]
14.177.199.124 made this change: [3]. Your lack of respect for consensus and preference for edit warring has already been amply demonstrated as anyone can see by looking at your talk page and block log. Mztourist (talk) 09:26, 2 November 2016 (UTC)[reply]
  • What is the evidence of your so-called "consensus" on this talk page?
  • Sounds like you've violated WP:NPA, but I'd kindly advise you to look at your own talk page before making any judgement. Dino nam (talk) 10:54, 2 November 2016 (UTC)[reply]

Popular culture entries[edit]

The policy regarding popular culture entries in military history articles is outlined here: WP:MILPOP. This provides the following: "In popular culture sections should be avoided unless the subject has had a well-cited and notable impact on popular culture. Any popular culture reference being considered for inclusion must be attributed to a reliable secondary source for the article topic. Items meeting these requirements should typically be worked into the text of the article..a separate section for popular culture items, and in particular the following, should be avoided: compendiums of every trivial appearance of the subject in pop culture (trivia), unsupported speculation about cultural significance or fictional likenesses (original research)". At the article's recent A-class review it was determined that the entries were not strongly referenced and hence they were removed. However, there seems to be a tendency to slowly add these back in. If there is a desire to add these back in, can I please ask that the entries be strongly referenced? The current entry is not well referenced (the references do not talk about the song's significance, just that it exists) and probably should be removed as such, and the one I removed here is not even referenced at all. Regards, AustralianRupert (talk) 05:21, 25 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]

I agree with all of this and more. I've also removed reference to the song as it is trivial per WP:MILPOP. Anotherclown (talk) 11:55, 25 January 2018 (UTC)[reply]